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We explore whether there is evidence of property rights amongst the homeless, and if so, how 
these rights are governed. By conducting interviews with 52 homeless people in Cape Town, we 
show that although the homeless are able to derive some value from assets, and can exclude other 
members of their community, these rights are precarious and dependent upon state agents not 
seizing the ‘property’ and overriding the community’s rules of the game. We demonstrate the 
intersectionality of claims with respect to the same physical property from the varying 
perspectives of the claimants involved and how this differs depending on the property. Homeless 
people rely on a community logic to develop rules of the game which results in the appearance of a 
market logic. In the absence of formal institutions effectively operating in their spaces, they have 
constituted social norms which provide some semblance of property rights respected intra-group. 
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Can those without property possess property rights? The question may seem illogical but 
underlying it is an important understanding of markets not only as an economic phenomena but as 
social constructs. Property rights should be thought of as a scale of rights, from that which 
conforms absolutely to each dimension of legal theory to a lesser scale which includes only some 
limited dimensions. For example, in housing markets we see rich hybrids of property models, from 
absolute tenure and leaseholds with detailed formal title deeds held in registry offices, to informal 
settlements that often exist in developing countries which may or may not have some form of title 
deed (either formal or informal). In the developing world we often see ‘legal pluralism’ where 
multiple legal systems coexist within a ‘bounded physical or social space’ and where the 
‘official/unofficial, formal/informal and traditional/modern [are] juxtaposed’ (Brown, 2015, p. 
238). 
Property rights have long been regarded as the foundation of economic development (Kaufman, 
2007). Property rights have, since Adam Smith, occupied primacy of place within economic and 
legal discourse and are regarded as essential for the efficient allocation and exploitation of scarce 
resources (Demsetz, 1964, 1966, 1967).ii Within economic theory, property rights feature pre-
eminently as regards a multitude of themes: R&D activity by local and foreign firms (Gittelman, 
2008; Luo, Sun, and Wang, 2011), economic growth (Bose, Murshid, and Wurm, 2012), land 
values (Markussen, Tarp, and Van den Broeck, 2011; Monkkonen, 2016), effects on poverty 
(Parizeau, 2015; Webster, Wu, Zhang and Sarkar, 2016), uncertainty and investment decisions 
(Kemeny, Castellaneta, Conti, and Veloso, 2014), boundaries between formal and informal 
activity (Adriaenssens and Hendrickx, 2015; Kus, 2010), innovation (Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007; 
Jay, 2013; Sweet and Maggio, 2015), market construction (McKague, Zietsma, and Oliver, 2015), 
institutional theory (Batjargal, Hitt, Tsui, Arregle, Webb, and Miller, 2013; Battilana and Casciaro, 
2012), and various theories on entrepreneurship (Gurses and Ozcan, 2015).  
The prominence of property rights within economic and social theory means that it is important 
that we are very clear as to what these rights entail. There is a danger that these rights are seen as 
dichotomous in that they either exist fully or not at all. This is analogous to the discourse on 
institutions and institutional voids. The latter has gained traction in various sub disciplines within 
management and economic theory and particularly with the rise of research into developing and 
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emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2010; Dhanaraj and Khanna, 2011; Luiz and Stewart, 
2014; Luiz et al., 2017; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008). But voids imply the complete absence of 
institutions and if this were the case there would be no activity possible and yet markets often 
thrive where these ‘voids’ supposedly exist. The institutions in some developing countries may not 
look the same as that in industrialized countries and may not be as ‘efficient’ in terms of how we 
want them to operate but they serve a purpose within their particular contexts. Increasingly, we 
understand that institutions are more complex and that actors find ways of carving out institutional 
spaces which allow them to operate in innovative ways (Dahan, Doh, Oetzel, and Yaziji, 2010; 
Feinberg and Gupta, 2009; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Murphy, Perrot, and Rivera-Santos, 
2012). We argue that property rights have similar characteristics and that they are not absolute and 
that there are rich pluralities in existence. 
This study explores the case of homelessness using a qualitative methodology whereby we 
interviewed 52 homeless people in Cape Town, South Africa. It asks whether there is evidence of 
property rights, and if so, how these rights are governed, and how these are balanced against other 
competing claims. Not only do we see forms of property rights not being governed by formal 
institutions, unlike other cases, such as squatters occupying land on urban peripheries and arguing 
for recognition of their rights against existing titleholders, in the case of the homeless we see a 
further hybrid, where rights are not exercised against titleholders but rather a hierarchy of 
economic rights against other homeless. In other words, we see the expression of these rights 
within a micro community and utilizing a community logic that is not enforceable outside of that 
community. It reinforces the notion of markets as social spaces, constructed on the basis of social 
relations (Bandelj, 2016; Granovetter, 1985; Krippner, 2001, 2002). 
Although the paper is interdisciplinary, it uses a law and economics lens which results in 
limitations but we work with these limitations to demonstrate the weaknesses of relying only on 
formal institutions and underplaying the role of self-organization. Furthermore, we demonstrate 
intersectionality and community logics and how the homeless are able to maneuver between the 
formal and informal rules. Our work contributes to our understanding of the organization and 
development of markets especially in less developed settings. By incorporating legal, economic, 
management, and sociological perspectives on markets and institutions it advances our conception 
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of how actors function in ‘in-between’ institutional spaces and indeed how they can construct 
markets in the absence of recognized legal rights through social constructs.  
2. Literature review 
2.1 Different forms of property rights and enforcement of those rights 
In its most complete form, property rights ‘gives its owner the right to derive value from the 
asset, to exclude others from using it, and to transfer the asset to others.’ But these rights may not 
always be complete and may result in an owner deriving ‘only some value from the asset, 
excluding only some people from using it, or transferring only certain uses for a specified time 
period’ (Anderson and McChesney, 2003, p. 1). This has resulted in much debate in both the 
philosophical and legal spheres over what comprises property rights.iii One view of property rights 
has focused on property rights as a ‘bundle of sticks’, where property rights are defined as a 
collection of different legal actions available to a person in possession of such rights. The bundle 
of sticks is a commonly used metaphor to describe the list of rights that vest in a holder pertaining 
to property. Robilant (2013) provides a concise formulation of the bundle as having four distinct 
characteristics: 
1. The bundle of sticks is a set of ‘analytically distinct entitlements’; 
2. The bundle of sticks approach is relational in nature, as it determines how people relate to 
each other around a common property; 
3. The bundle is assorted and backed by a state; and 
4. Each of the sticks within the bundle is malleable, and is subject to change based on shifting 
regulations and law, which in turn are shaped by ethics and policy considerations. 
A bundle of sticks can be seen as the collection of rights and obligations that govern the 
relationship between people over property. 
Within institutional theory we can differentiate between property rights as economic and/or 
legal rights (Barzel, 2015; Hodgson, 2015). For Alchian (1965), economic rights are property 
rights of use that exist in reality, and are dependent on ‘custom, reciprocity and voluntary 
constraints’ (Allen, 2000, p. 898). In contrast, legal property rights are those which are determined, 
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shaped and enforced by a legal system (Gray and Gray, 1998). Economic rights can be recognized 
and endorsed by the state, but such recognition is not the defining feature of an economic property 
right (Alchian, 1965). Allen (2000, p. 989) notes that this definition is commonly accepted and 
that although ‘economic property rights are enhanced by the law, they are ultimately use rights and 
the greater extent one can exercise these uses and bear the consequences the greater are the 
property rights, regardless of the law’. 
Barzel (1997, p. 3), following Alchain, defines economic property rights as ‘the individual’s 
ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset) directly or to consume 
it indirectly through exchange’. This definition is linked to restrictions that are inherent in the asset 
– a person will have fewer rights if the asset can be easily stolen or has restrictions on the manner 
in which it can be traded (Barzel, 1997; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2014). In addition, an 
important characteristic of an economic right is the maintenance of a fluidity of the boundaries of 
the right. With any changes to the individual’s ability to consume the services of the asset (by 
encroachment or through theft, for example), the fundamental content of the economic property 
right will shift to reflect the new context (Barzel, 1997). The notion of economic rights can thus be 
summarized as the right of use to property, which may not be legally recognized (nor protected), 
and where that right of use is relative to factors influencing the nature of the asset itself. While 
economic rights have been characterized as ‘informal rights’ (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2014, p. 
108), this characterization has been made by juxtaposition with ‘formal’ rights, or legal property 
rights.  
Different types of property rights allocation are possible depending on the nature of the 
resource and whether it entails state/public ownership, open access, common ownership, or private 
ownership. Among the claimants to property rights, we have the public, the state, and private 
property owners. These rights are not definitive and competing claims are possible as in the case 
of indigenous claims to land or informal squatter settlements (in either public or private 
possession) or in the prevalence of common property. This raises the need for enforcement of the 
rights and it has been suggested that the most appropriate form of enforcement lies in the term 
governance of rights, which is understood to be the process by which the principle of exclusion is 
mediated (Merrill and Smith, 2001, 2011; Smith, 2002). Governance requires that all members of a 
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particular community understand the rules of the game, and will take appropriate action to keep 
playing within the rules (Smith, 2002). 
At the most formal level we have the state and Hodgson (2015) makes the point that legal 
factors, involving the recognition of authority, are important to property rights whether in an 
economic or legal sphere. He refers to De Soto (2001, p. 683) who pointed out the deleterious 
implications of neglecting the ‘legal infrastructure that buttresses property’. De Soto (2001, p. 157) 
places the commercial aspects of property rights at the core of the subject. In order for property to 
be translated into gains, it needs to be able to be traded, or, in De Soto’s (2001, p. 7) words, to 
‘transform assets and labor into capital’. The De Soto effect has received support (Besley, 
Burchardi, and Ghatak, 2012; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2014; Williamson and Kerekes, 2011). 
However, the broad approach of implementing formal land title systems has been criticized 
through the implication that a policy decision to formalize land tenure can allow a state to escape 
moral and constitutional obligations to provide adequate public services and that it may 
underestimate the role that informal institutions play in determining the security of property rights 
(Brown, 2015; Sanghera and Satybaldieva, 2012; Williamson and Kerekes, 2011). 
The state is not the only enforcer of property rights and Hodgson (2015, p. 701) argues that 
whilst the ‘success of capitalism depends on systems of law enforcement’, that in ‘their absence 
people fall back on other means of establishing obligations and ensuring compliance’. Such 
systems of spontaneous enforcement, which may rely on social ties, bureaucratic co-option, and 
threats of violence, show how ‘commercial agreements can be maintained in the absence of 
adequate state systems of law’. A key feature of any set of rules is the creation of social norms via 
‘repeat games’ as these norms create relational constraints (Williamson, 1993). This speaks to the 
quality of the institution with higher levels of quality being associated with lower transactional 
costs. Key to establishing quality is credibility and commitment (North, 1981, 1989), two aspects 
that reinforce the rules through repeat games as participants feel that their interests will be dealt 
with in accordance with the rules. Multiple interactions between market actors forge social ties of 
trust and understanding particularly if the market exchange is repetitious. By socially embedding 
this exchange, in the context of institutional failures, markets are able to ‘develop and evolve’ as 
in-group members rely on a ‘cohesive social structure’ to solve market problems (McKague et al., 
2015, p. 1086). Eggertson (2013) notes that informal institutions need not display the permanent 
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quality of formal institutions, and that their lifespan could be limited to brief periods during which 
actors come to some sort of agreement regarding the applicable rules of the game. 
2.2 Intersectionality of claims and rights 
Markus (2012, p. 242) makes the point that ‘[O]wnership claims remain unsettled in much of 
the developing world’ and that this is often related to the fact that developing states may be weak. 
In these contexts, property rights may be contested and the state may not be the only guarantor of 
the enforcement of property rights. This may result in a more bottom-up approach to securing 
property. He (p.272) notes that in countries as diverse as Peru, Egypt and post-1945 Japan, ‘legally 
effective allocation of property rights, triggering growth and investment by allowing assets to be 
used as collateral, emerged only to the extent local informal consensus regarding property rights’ 
protection preexisted (and was later acknowledged by) formal national institutions.’ Even in the 
case of the development of British property rights, this was ‘secured through the informal power of 
the gentry’, manifested through its alliances with militias and its ability to manage property 
efficiently, and that the formal institutions ‘gradually came to reflect the informal power of 
owners’ over time. This testifies to the often endogenous nature of the development of property 
rights and how competing claims and rights are ‘settled’ over time. Throughout history we have 
seen an intersectionality of claims and rights as regards property and the institutionalization of 
these rights has often been the result of messy compromises and trade-offs, violence, clientelism, 
corruption, power battles, or the de facto becoming the de jure through time and practice. 
Where institutional capacity is poor, laws may be weakly enforced or not at all.iv Holland 
(2016, p. 233) raises a further phenomenon which is distinct from weak enforcement, namely the 
concept of forbearance which she defines as the ‘intentional and revocable government leniency 
toward violations of the law’. She argues (p. 232) that in ‘much of the developing world, legal 
rules are ignored’ and that this gap between ‘lived reality and parchment law’ are often interpreted 
to reflect a weak state but may in fact represent forbearance. Politicians may choose not to enforce 
laws to mobilize voters and to signal their distributive commitments in the context of inadequate 
social policy. She explains these strategies by presenting data on street vending and squatting in 
urban Latin America. In this way, the process of forbearance by the state results in the growing 
acceptance and institutionalization of activities that may formally be illegal. Squatters, may over 
time, find a gradual de facto recognition of their squatting rights on land which may formally be 
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deeded elsewhere. The longer they are allowed to stay on the contested land, the stronger the 
claims they develop to it as a matter of custom. 
Likewise, Schlicht (1993, p. 178) argues that ‘[H]istory creates entitlements, and these 
influence behavior’. He demonstrates the importance of customs in everyday market transactions 
and that they may make unfeasible transactions possible or may block certain transactions. 
Furthermore, customs provide the groundwork for property and contract and that forms of property 
emerge as arrangements become ‘dominant in social evolution’ (p.181). Schlicht (2008, p. 615) 
states that effective norms shape compliance and induce entitlements and obligations: 
‘Entitlements are rights, as perceived by the individuals. They are not, however, abstract legal 
rights. Rather, they denote the subjectively perceived rights that go along with a motivational 
disposition to defend them.’ We see these perceived rights manifest in many different ways within 
developing countries and there are a multitude of arrangements through which formal and informal 
institutions accommodate and occasionally resolve the intersectionality of claims and rights. Our 
case of the homeless will demonstrate the norms and customs and rules which have developed to 
govern the homeless amongst themselves in their spaces, and to arrange the hierarchy of 
competing claims. 
2.3 Property rights and the homeless 
Waldron (1991, p. 299) defines homelessness as: ‘A person who is homeless is, obviously 
enough, a person who has no home. One way of describing the plight of a homeless individual 
might be to say that there is no place governed by a private property rule where he is allowed to 
be.’ Baron (2005, p. 1429) notes that homelessness is ‘a negative, a collection of lacks’. 
We have noted that whilst legal property rights concern the formal rights determined and 
shaped by a legal system, that economic property rights are use rights, and are founded on 
‘custom, reciprocity and voluntary constraints’ (Allen, 2000, p. 898). This creates the possibility 
that economic and legal property rights, each vested in different parties, can coexist 
simultaneously in the same property. This mitigates the concern noted above of the tension 
between private property and homeless people, given that such tension arises exclusively from 
legal property rights. Members of a community will develop their own rules of the property rights 
game when negotiating access to a shared resource (see for instance Ellickson, 1993; Ostrom et al., 
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1992). In considering homeless people as members of a community negotiating shared rules to 
shared public spaces, the basis for testing the content of such rights is formed. This suggests a 
relationship between the perception of the value of property rights, acknowledgment of 
boundaries, and a careful method of engagement around such rights. 
Access to advantageous locations provide greater benefit and are more sought after. Du Toit 
(2010, p. 113) notes that homeless people are drawn towards inner-city public spaces (‘zones of 
dependence’) through the relationship between high volumes of people and the associated 
economic opportunities. This suggests that the attraction of the target population to areas that 
contain specific economic advantages is an indicator that homeless people broadly act in 
accordance with their self-interest, and that notionally within inner city areas there will exist more 
advantageous locations than others, which in turn provides the basis for the emergence of property 
rights. Valado’s (2006) study of homeless people in Tucson examines the activities that homeless 
people rely upon to generate income. These include ‘panhandling’ (begging), accessing regular 
charity vouchers and food stamps, selling drugs and scavenging. Critically, she notes that 
homeless people made efforts to claim, mark and defend space using clearly defined strategies. 
Two critical features emerge. Firstly, the activities reported as being central to homeless people’s 
livelihoods in Tucson can be considered to be location-specific activities – begging, for instance, is 
optimized in higher traffic areas. Secondly, the efforts to claim, mark and defend space speak of a 
claim to a property right, almost in direct accord with the theory discussed above. 
The question of how people relate to one another for access to a shared resource is particularly 
relevant to this paper because of the position of homeless people in occupying property and 
presumably competing with each other for the most advantageous positions. In his seminal paper, 
Hardin (1968) argued that when faced with a common resource, users were unable to come to a 
mutually beneficial arrangement to prevent depletion of that resource. The ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ assumes that because people are unable to self- and community-regulate the use of a 
shared resource, private property and property rights represent the most optimal manner to avoid 
the decimation of common pool resources (Demsetz, 1967; Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 2008). The 
‘Tragedy’ was accepted as the invariable consequence of common pool resources (and therefore as 
justification for private property rights and privatization of public property) until the intervention 
of Ostrom in a series of papers (Ostrom, 1999, 2008; Ostrom and Schlager, 1996; Ostrom et al., 
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1992). She argued that policy makers should not presume that ‘the individuals involved are caught 
in an inexorable tragedy from which there is no mistake’ (Ostrom et al., 1992, p. 414). Her 
findings showed that when people are provided with an opportunity to formulate their own rules 
regarding access to a shared resource, they would frequently do so in a manner that secured higher 
joint outcomes, and would do so without the need for an external party.  
The test of the content of such property rights is seen as the applicability of such rights against 
other members of the same (homeless) community. This reinforces the notion that ‘social 
structuring provides the necessary context for economic transactions’ (McKague et al., 2015, p. 
1087). The community logic (to use Venkataraman et al.’s term, 2016) within the homeless 
population provides a basis for a shared understanding of the rules of the game and these rules are 
enforceable within this community. But this shared understanding does not translate into a market 
logic outside of this community. Whilst the social relations result in levels of trust and social 
capital (Kamath and Cowan, 2015) which allow for a shared understanding of rules and collective 
rationalization, this is not rationalized (in the Weberian sense) into a formalized process whereby 
these rights are enforceable outside of the community. Venkataraman et al. (2016, p. 711) argue 
that these contradictory logics can co-exist and be ‘fruitfully combined’. 
It is evident that homeless people often have ‘their’ property rights negatively influenced by the 
effect of formal institutions – this has been reflected in literature as the privatization of public 
space, leading to the herding of homeless people away from areas previously accessed (Baron, 
2004, 2005; Casey, Goudie, and Reeve, 2008; Waldron, 1991). If we return to North and his 
suggestion that institutions represent the rules of the game and a collective understanding of a 
particular rule, then the possibility emerges that homeless people could define their own rules of 
their game, applicable to members of that particular group, for the use of property. The repetitious 
nature of their interactions create social relations which can solve market problems such as agency 
and transaction costs (McKague et al., 2015, p. 1086). These informal institutions need not be 
permanent as long as it is a set of shared rules of the game. These rules may only be applicable for 
a short period, and may arise spontaneously, but will govern the transaction costs homeless people 
encounter in establishing, defending and maintaining their property rights.v 
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In what follows, we examine whether there is evidence of some economic property rights 
amongst the homeless, as defined above, and if so, how these rights are governed, and how these 
are balanced against other competing claims. 
3. Research methodology 
Qualitative research methodology was used for this research as it is a useful approach for 
examining people in their particular realities. Data was gathered through semi-structured 
interviews with respondents that fell within the population group of homeless people. Du Toit 
(2010, p. 113) defines three separate categories of homeless people within a South African 
metropolitan context. These are (a) detached homeless persons, (b) temporary overnight sleepers, 
and (c) informal settlement dwellers. He notes that ‘temporary overnight sleepers’ include people 
who have recently been evicted and people who are homeless during the week. In other words, 
people who have a defined home, presumably in a remote location, but who elect to sleep rough 
within a city to avoid the transaction costs of having to commute to and from that location to a city 
on a daily basis (du Toit, 2010). This paper focuses on those persons who are ‘detached homeless 
persons’. However, this definition remains problematic. Tipple and Speak (2005), in a survey of 
the definitions of homelessness used within various developing countries, show that there are 
additional nuances that require consideration. These include lifestyle, location, permanence of 
occupation or security of tenure, housing quality, and welfare entitlement. The Fédération 
Européenne d'Associations Nationales Travaillant avec les Sans-Abri (FEANTSA, 2014) uses the 
criteria of ‘rooflessness’ which they define as being without a shelter of any kind and sleeping 
rough. They therefore rely on the twin factors of location and permanence of occupation or 
security of tenure as their defining principles. 
Accordingly, the population that formed the subject of this study are homeless persons, who are 
considered to be ‘roofless’ and who do not enjoy rights of permanent occupation. These criteria 
were assessed at the commencement of each interview through the question ‘where did you sleep 
last night?’ Following responses, interviews were either terminated (the potential respondent did 
not meet the required criteria) or continued. The interviews were conducted in the Cape Town 
(South Africa) city area and its immediate surrounds. 52 interviews were conducted with 
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respondents who met the criteria noted above. We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the 
interviewee. 
We utilized a semi-structured questionnaire – it was semi structured so as to align the interview 
with our key research questions but with sufficient flexibility to allow questions to evolve as the 
interview proceeded. This was especially important with our particular respondents who often 
wandered in their responses and we wanted to give them the freedom to determine the pace and 
nature of the interview whilst still being able to focus it on our research questions. The 
questionnaire addressed issues relating to the relationship between a place and the motivation for 
occupying that place, time allocation for the establishment of these rights, the effects of formal and 
informal institutions on the applicable rules of the game, and the link between property rights, 
tradability, and entry and exit. 
The procedure used for data collection draws on the work of Valado (2006). We identified 
recruitment sites that met certain criteria, and which other respondents had identified as heavily 
used by homeless people. Following on from the identification of the particular locations, we spent 
significant time within those locations to establish credibility with the research study group. At the 
commencement of each interview, consent was obtained from each respondent. This consent was 
captured as part of the interview recording. Interviews were transcribed and then analyzed. The 
Framework Approach was relied upon as the structured process for the analysis of qualitative data. 
It is constituted of five stages: familiarization with data, creating a thematic framework, coding 
and indexing of data, charting and mapping and interpretation.  
There are a number of inherent challenges in interviewing homeless people, including reliance 
on self-reporting, inconsistency of method through the impact of other variables, and the lack of 
information to corroborate the interviewee’s disclosures (Tsemberis, McHugo, Williams, 
Hanrahan, and Stefancic, 2007). Noting the limitation of the last and first mentioned, 
inconsistency of method was managed by attempting, where possible, to interview respondents 
outside of mining windows (see Appendix 1 for explanation of terms used), and to interview 
respondents in the most suitable place possible and at the best times to ensure their coherence.  
The validity of the research was ensured in various ways. From a broad perspective, it is noted 
that theoretical validity is an important step towards ensuring validity. Theoretical validity is the 
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match between data and theory and is enhanced by extended fieldwork and by theory 
triangulation. The data collection process relied not only on the interviews themselves, but on 
extended periods of observation and notetaking. All-in-all the interaction process with our 
respondents started in September 2014 and continued through until July 2016  
The various layers of the research questions ensured that respondents were given an opportunity 
to provide responses that speak to a wide range of property rights issues, instead of a single 
perspective. In addition, the theory underpinning our research provides an opportunity to 
triangulate findings. It must be noted that it is not the intention of this paper to generalize its 
results as being applicable to all homeless people as we are using this example as a unit of analysis 
to describe a particular context. 
Reliability pertains to the consistency of measured results and, within a qualitative study, coding 
is a key determinant of reliability. The issue of discriminant capacity of the coder in categorizing 
text content has been addressed by using factual categories as the basis for coding. The theory 
underpinning this study requires emphasis to be placed on themes that surround factual 
circumstances and the direct opinions expressed about those circumstances. Accordingly, it is 
suggested that a researcher would reasonably reach the same conclusions regarding coding and 
thematic choice. At all stages, we ensured that there is a clear audit trail available for scrutiny, 
including notes, recordings and transcripts of all interviews. 
Ethical clearance for this study was obtained from Ethics Committees within the universities the 
researchers are attached to and we were particularly careful to ensure that participation was 
voluntary, that they were free to stop the interview at any point or to not answer any questions that 
made them uncomfortable. As already mentioned, we tried not to get in the way of their daily 
mining activities and spent a significant amount of timing gaining their trust and building up our 
own credibility. 
4. Presentation of results 
4.1 Location choices and economic advantages 
Economists argue that the key driver for the creation of property rights is personal economic 
benefit derived from such rights (Demsetz, 1964). We see elements of this within our homeless 
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population as they seek to exercise some ‘ownership’ over resources through an understanding 
amongst themselves - a community logic; not in formal law nor against others outside the 
community. For example, the respondent group derived direct personal economic benefit from the 
mining of bins. The term (see Appendix 1) is related to mining in its ordinary sense, where a 
resource is deliberately and systematically extracted (and processed) to create economic value for 
the miner. From mining, a stroller is able to obtain goods discarded as waste to sell them onwards 
at high-traffic locations. Mining presents the secondary opportunity to source food but the 
predominant incentive to mine is to generate cash. 
The City of Cape Town waste collection schedule determines on which day specific areas will 
have their waste collected. Households place their bins outside on the same day each week. This 
situation could result in conflict between the miners, but the schedules lend themselves neatly to a 
repeat game which requires a more credible rule than one that simply arises at the point where two 
strollers meet at a bin. Respondents avoid confrontation through a clearly defined rule of first-
come-first-served for the mining of a specific bin. A more significant opportunity is where an 
individual is allowed to exclusively mine the bins from a large apartment complex. By 
demonstrating reliability (being outside the apartment block when the supervisor needs to move 
the bins outside), consistency (being there each week) and usefulness (cleaning the bins after 
mining and thus performing an undesirable piece of work), a stroller is able to build a relationship 
with a building supervisor. The apex point of this relationship is being granted permission by the 
supervisor to enter the property to remove the bins. At this point, the bins from that complex are 
regarded as temporarily belonging to that stroller. In reaching that particular status, a stroller has 
successfully established a right in the eyes of both the supervisor and other strollers, and thereby 
lowered transaction costs. 
‘You see it works like this – sometimes if you’re there first then they’re yours, but if you are not 
first, you get nothing… Some places, they say, ‘that’s my bins’. And they can do nothing, because 
it’s yours, you take it out, you help the caretaker. That’s your property. So you arrange with the 
caretaker to take out the bins – then it’s your bins. The caretaker will see that nobody scratches 
there, because he knows who you are. He can trust you to go inside to fetch the bins’ (Hendricks, 
Sea Point). 
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The development of such a relationship requires a deliberate trade-off. In attempting to initiate a 
bond with a supervisor, a stroller will forsake the short-term opportunity available on that day to 
mine other bins, instead using her time for future benefit. This suggests a trade-off between 
production and the creation of property rights (Grossman, 2000). However, as Grossman notes, the 
trade-off of the allocation of time for either creating property rights or production is dependent on 
factors including whether that right can be created. The role of the supervisor, as both gatekeeper 
to the opportunity and as the allocator and enforcer of the right, is a factor that suggests there is an 
environment conducive to the creation of property rights. 
The opportunity to have exclusive access to mine a large number of bins on a weekly basis is 
arguably a longer term economic benefit, which justifies the investment of time and trade-off of 
short term production (Demsetz, 1967). In addition, the role played by a supervisor suggests the 
presence of a mechanism to protect such rights, implying a lessor need for an investment into 
fighting skills to protect the property right from competition (Muthoo, 2004). 
The first-come-first-served rule for mining is a restraint for strollers as an acknowledgement of 
the competition for resources. Given that many bins are placed at curbside either the evening 
before scheduled waste collection, or early in the morning on the day, successful mining requires a 
central location. This allows for speed to mining sites as proximity is a key competitive advantage. 
In addition, a central location allows for access into inner-city areas where mined goods can be 
traded for cash. An optimal location has equidistant access to both mining and selling to minimize 
time wastage and to increase productivity. A secure night-time location that allows for both 
sustained mining and access to trade represents opportunity for future economic benefit. 
4.2 Competing rights and the right to exclude 
Our definition of property rights highlighted three elements, namely the ability to derive value 
from the asset, to exclude others from using it, and to transfer the asset to others (Anderson and 
McChesney, 2003). In the previous section we illustrated their ability to derive some value from 
the assets, and to exclude others from using it but these were limited within the community logic. 
The respondent group displayed a strong orientation toward the right to exclude. Specifically, this 
orientation was directed at other homeless people, and was not found to extend to members of the 
general public, property owners, or the police. It was noted that respondents had either been 
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invited or had invited others to establish a claim within the broader public space. Despite this, 
respondents (predominantly those occupying space-constrained areas like a cave or an overhang) 
maintained that they were able to exclude others from their specific space. In this regard, a 
distinction can be drawn between those occupying a space within a larger public space, and those 
who occupy a space with limited capacity for newcomers. With regard to the latter, it is suggested 
that respondents could be classified as a limited group of insiders, acting in concert to limit access 
by others (Smith, 2002). The former group face inherent restraints in being able to exercise a right 
to exclude others from a wider public space, and in being unable to police and defend a larger 
territory. 
The distinction between the two groups was further emphasized through a difference in attitude 
to newcomers or people with competing claims. Respondents occupying space within a larger area 
(a tree within a park, for instance) indicated that their approach to encroachment was to first 
negotiate and then to fight, whilst those who occupy space-constrained areas were demonstrably 
less flexible in their approach. 
 ‘No, one must be out because it’s my place’ (Damara, Bantry Bay). 
‘He can’t. We will tell him there’s no way he can come… This is our place. He can’t come and 
take… this is our place… You see, you don’t enter another man’s property. If I am working here, 
you can’t work here’ (Hendricks, Sea Point). 
The respondents who had established themselves within public spaces were emphatic about their 
claim to such space against other homeless. It was found that longer-tenure residents within a 
micro-community (a community within a specific public place) acted in concert to publicize 
existing claims to newcomers, and to enforce existing claims if necessary. This suggests that 
primary claims are regarded as stronger than subsequent claims by the respondent group 
(Grossman, 2000). In addition, existing claims can be seen as a specific feature that a newcomer 
would need to manage in order to establish a new claim. To successfully develop tenure, and thus 
be able to access sustained mining opportunities, a newcomer would need to internalize the 
externalities posed by existing residents: ‘It’s a big house, there’s a lot of rooms – you can find 
somewhere else a nice room but that room is taken and this room is taken’ (Josias, De Waal 
Park). 
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The orientation towards the right to exclude was extended to the mining of bins. As described 
above, the first-come-first-serve rule is premised on the right of the first-arrived stroller to exclude 
all others from a particular bin. In the instance of a supervisor-sanctioned relationship, a stroller is 
able to rely on the supervisor to enforce her right to exclude. This additional layer of protection 
suggests a shift towards governance of rights, as a successful challenge to the incumbent is 
unlikely to result in a succession of the right (Smith, 2002). 
The story of the Maine Lobster gangs has been used in academic writing as an illustration of 
self-governance of a shared resource (Acheson, 1985; Ostrom, 2008; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992) 
and of how a group excludes others from a shared resource through limited membership and 
boundary demarcation (Smith, 2002). It was observed that the respondents used relational factors 
like established tenure and familiarity to establish a group within a public space and that these 
groups would act to exclude others from establishing competing claims to spaces occupied by 
members, and to prevent parties external to the group from stealing belongings. However, these 
groups were limited in their ability to consistently enforce exclusion through periods where no 
group members were present to act. For emerging or insecure rights contexts, defense of 
boundaries requires the use of sentries (Alston, Harris, and Mueller, 2012). This implies that such 
groups may fall outside of the definition of a collective-choice property regime exercising a right 
to exclude (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). 
Perhaps predictably, the most common means of enforcing exclusion was by threat of or use of 
violence. This is consistent with the position noted by Alston et al. (2012, p. 766), who state that 
‘when each side perceives that it has a reasonable chance of asserting its right by force, conflict is 
the likely outcome’. However, in the instance of well-established tenure rights and the presence of 
groups demonstrating a commitment to enforcing individual rights on behalf of a collective, the 
threat of violence is often adequate to enable resolution of a dispute (Skaperdas, 1992). This was 
confirmed in our interviews and our observations that violence was limited but that enforcement 
would occur through violence as a last resort. Respondents would often say if someone tried to 
intrude in their space ‘we will chase them with sticks.’ But this happened surprisingly seldom 
given the nature of their living environment.  
Respondents noted that they had the ability to return to their location after an absence (often 
absences ranged from a few days to several months of hospital treatment or incarceration). Despite 
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such absence, respondents were able to re-establish their rights to a particular location by 
enforcing the exclusion of others from that location. This implies that well-entrenched incumbents 
enjoy an advantage over subsequent claimants despite a period of absence from occupation 
(Grossman, 2000). This advantage was noted as being rooted in relational factors and the 
willingness of external parties, particularly law enforcement officials and neighboring private 
property owners, to act in support of the original incumbent’s claim for restoration. Yet despite 
their assurances that they ‘owned’ the space respondents generally preferred to leave at least one 
of the group at the location to ensure that someone was always present to protect their property but 
this was to prevent petty theft of belongings rather than of the living space.  
Several respondents were indignant at the suggestion we posed that the space they were 
occupying would be free for others if they left the space to go mining. They were genuinely 
perplexed by the idea that someone else could claim the same space: ‘This place is mine. Nobody 
else can come. How can they come?’ (Funeka, Green Point). The same respondent gave an 
example that even when she had been incarcerated for several months, she could return to her 
space and nobody had taken it. Her behavior and words demonstrated a real sense of entitlement 
and ‘ownership’ of that space and this came through repeatedly. When we pushed respondents and 
asked if that claim extended to the legally recognized owners of private property or to the City of 
Cape Town as regards public spaces, we were often looked at with bewilderment as if the answer 
should be obvious and it was always in the negative. The rights extended within the homeless 
group only. But respondents discussed how the legal owners gave them greater rights in the eyes 
of the other homeless and showed pride in this fact. One respondent (Bongani, Green Point) who 
lived in bushes bordering a local tennis club indicated how the club caretaker recognized his claim 
to that space by chasing other homeless away if they tried to occupy that space: ‘He knows it’s 
me’. 
It is noted that an in rem right to exclude is typically understood as a legal right valid against the 
rest of the world (Merrill and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2002). However, the respondent group are not 
in a legal position to enforce their right to exclude against the rest of the world. Instead their right 
to exclude is largely limited to members of the same group. This is consistent with the definitional 
status of homeless people as people without formal legal property rights. 
4.3 Transaction costs amongst the homeless 
20 
The emergence of economic property rights among the respondent group suggests that there is 
little actual cost in establishing a claim to a space within public property. The ability to establish a 
claim is relative to the presence of existing claims, and the availability of a right to be claimed, 
with private property a constraining factor. Respondents noted that establishing a right involves 
little more than the selection of an available place. 
There are specific costs associated with maintaining a property right and these costs come about 
largely in the form of managing the risk of theft of blankets and the effect of PK operations carried 
out by law enforcement officials. A stroller can mitigate both risks by electing to move to a safer 
location away from areas where PK occurs. However, this will require a trade-off that will 
minimize production ability. 
Respondents managed the issue of their personal belongings in two separate ways. One group 
carried their blankets (and in fact, all of their belongings) with them constantly as a means to avoid 
the risk of theft. The other group stored their blankets at or near their night-time location, using 
manholes, trees and holes dug into beach sand as storage facilities. These respondents require 
mobility for mining, and in addition, often were able to rely on group members to ward off threats 
of theft. Those respondents who stored their blankets on site reported that it was relatively easy to 
obtain replacements. This suggests that they are not actively seeking to avoid risk (unlike the 
blanket carriers) and have established that the gains from successful mining are in excess of the 
cost of averting risk by carrying blankets and impairing mobility.  
In examining the role played by groups in the enforcement of rights, it was clear that despite the 
existence of such groups, they did not play a consistently credible role in averting threats to 
existing rights. With respect to the theft of blankets stored on site, a group member is only able to 
act if he or she is present. In addition, the seemingly impervious approach of organized homeless 
gangsters to existing rules further fractures the credibility of group enforcement. This suggests that 
despite attempts to create an institutional response to maintain property rights, the institutional 
quality has remained poor, with associated higher transaction costs. The practice of PK appeared at 
first to confirm the limitation to the rules of the stroller game imposed by formal institutions. As 
Feige (1990, p. 993) notes: ‘The salience of informal activities derives from the fact that their 
existence is intimately connected with the institutional arrangements imposed by the state. As 
such, any positive or negative outcomes associated with the emergence of the informal economy 
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can, in principle, be reinforced or weakened by policy actions which modify the institutional 
setting.’ 
The use of PK activities by law enforcement supports the negative influence of formal 
institutions on homeless people and their use of space (Baron, 2004, 2005; Waldron, 1991). 
However, following an arrest for PK, strollers returned to their original locations. This suggests 
that despite a deliberate formal state intervention to weaken or sever the ties between a stroller and 
her demarcated place, as per Feige (1990), respondents had internalized this externality as yet 
another disturbance and incorporated this as a cost of maintaining a right to occupation (Allen, 
2000). Furthermore our respondents were often upset by the erratic behavior of the police in that 
they sometimes appeared to recognize their right to certain spaces and at other times they would 
remove them from these same spaces. Bongani indicated that he had been living in that space for 
close to 10 years and had for many years been left alone by the police although recently he had 
been subject to harassment from them. He could not understand this as, in his mind, he had been 
given tacit approval from the police years before when they ignored him and now they were 
‘reneging’ on this and behaving inconsistently. 
4.4 Governance of the Commons 
The reliance of respondents on access to public property (for both night-time accommodation 
and for access to mining opportunities) suggests a relationship between adherence to rules and 
maintaining access to shared resources. In the context of the respondents, degradation of the 
resource is not only about a depletion of the production capacity of that resource, but also the 
diminished ability of stroller occupants to maintain credible claims to property in the face of 
increased attention by law enforcement officials or formal holders of property rights. The issue of 
PK noted above is an example of a structured interaction between strollers and law enforcement 
agencies. Respondents were aware that they needed to adhere to certain standards of behavior and 
activities in that any deviation from such standards could result in pressure being brought to bear 
on such individuals by law enforcement agencies. Examples include keeping a sleeping area tidy, 
avoiding sleeping with blankets during the day, and being awake by specific times. By not 
observing these rules, the tenure status of that particular person would be undermined. One group 
of homeless people were located at the side of a block of apartments and they realized the owners 
of those apartments had the ability to make their lives difficult if they so choose. But they had 
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reached an implicit détente with the owners accepting them on condition that they kept the place 
neat and remained quiet. The respondents would hush us if we asked questions too loudly as they 
did not want to annoy the owners. Also they indicated to us that part of their responsibility was to 
ensure that others did not come and disturb the property owners and that they would protect their 
cars from being damaged. 
‘So we don’t disturb them (the apartment dwellers). We keep it clean and not too much noise. 
They know us. They leave us alone’ (Faaiza, Three Anchor Bay). 
‘Like for instance, we’re not supposed to sleep late, so they (law enforcement officials) will 
come in the morning and come wake up people. To make their job easier, rather get up earlier – 
you see – get in their good books and they won’t treat you bad, because if they must come every 
time to wake you up, they gonna get tired and they gonna get cross’ (Zolani, Gardens). 
The formation of smaller groups within the stroller community suggests one of the key benefits 
noted by Ostrom (1999) with regard to common-pool resources, namely the inclusion of 
trustworthy participants. The effect of a smaller group, acting in concert with a shared 
understanding of applicable rules, lowers defense and enforcement costs for members of that 
group. This is supported through observed group’s shared commitment to not stealing from one 
another (and thus undermining the trust between members), and through a commitment to 
publicizing and defending the claims of incumbents against encroachment. The inability of a 
smaller group to corral the wider user population into an adherent state should not be interpreted as 
a lack of ability by the strollers to self-govern access to a shared resource. In the main, the public 
spaces involved were large, and by definition, incapable of being governed completely. For other, 
smaller spaces, respondents demonstrated that they were able to regulate access more effectively, 
as the group in occupation would act to both exclude others and ensure group compliance to 
standards that provided for sustained occupation. 
The demonstration of accepted rules of the game by respondents alludes to the existence of 
informal institutions or a community logic governing a common-pool resource. It is not necessary 
for the principle behind these rules to be universally understood but rather that the rules are 
effective and relied upon by users within the stroller community (see Pejovich, 2012). These rules 
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have developed through the impact and requirements of the formal environment and through a 
shared acceptance of the need for governance amongst the repeated interactions of the homeless. 
4.5 Trading rights amongst the homeless 
The final component of the property rights definition is the ability to transfer the asset to others. 
A key limitation of the informal property rights is the inability of informal rights holders to 
successfully transfer or sell their rights to a third party in a similar manner to rights holders within 
the formal market (Sanghera and Satybaldieva, 2012). It is suggested that the property rights 
described by the respondents are categorized as in personam rights, or rights that vest in a specific 
individual. Unlike rights in rem, in personam rights are not capable of being transferred from 
person to person (Van der Walt, 2011). This reinforces the distinction between economic and legal 
property rights. Despite the clear conceptual difference between the two, a person without a 
correlative legal right is inhibited in her quest to translate an economic property right into gains. 
Respondents indicated that they did not trade their sleeping spaces amongst each other. We found 
this rather surprising as they traded other belongings and even traded activities such as temporarily 
giving up their space as a car guard, or good spots to beg. This may be attributed in part to an 
absence of tradable rights (and the associated lack of institutional support to enforce a claim), and 
through the in personam nature of the rights described by the respondent group. We pursued this 
further and two issues came to the fore. First, a genuine attachment to their living spaces and the 
stability it provided, and thus having no desire to move. Funeka stated that she was better off as 
long as she had her fixed space and that she could only sleep if she was in her own space. Second, 
and more fundamentally, they saw no value to trading in their spaces as it was not enforceable to 
the rest of the world and thus the value was to them alone. No one would ‘buy’ their space through 
some form of trade as ‘only a dom (stupid) person would do that’ (Caleb, Green Point). 
The most commonly reported manner of accessing or trading an economic opportunity was 
either through opportunism or invitation. Respondents noted a willingness to act as temporary car 
guards, in the event that the existing rights holder either was not available on a particular day, or 
needed relief for a short period. An invitation to participate in an opportunity was conditional on 
the premise of adherence to the rules of the game. The right (with associated commercial benefit) 
could only be transferred to a person who would maintain the same behaviors that facilitated the 
establishment of the original right. Any deviation from the status quo could see the right destroyed 
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in its entirety, and thus removing any further commercial benefit at that location. In addition, the 
responses indicated that those who had received invitations to either participate with an incumbent 
in an opportunity (like the guarding of cars), or on behalf of an incumbent suggested that no 
transfer of a right had taken place. Respondents, in acting opportunistically in the absence of an 
invitation, could be seen as engaging in low-stakes opportunism but respondents would cede their 
temporary assumption of space back to the incumbent when challenged. 
5. Conclusion 
The role of property rights within economic and management theory means that it is important 
that we fully understand the complexities of what these rights entail. This paper has demonstrated, 
through the study of the extreme case of homelessness, that property rights are nuanced, and that 
they are not binary and instead can be thought of as a bundle of sticks. The existence of all the 
sticks is the ideal system of property rights but not all sticks may be in existence under all 
circumstances. This does not mean the absence of these rights but rather a weaker form of these 
rights may exist. Hann (2007, p. 310) argues that the bundle metaphor provides a useful way to 
address the complex systemic character of the ‘property infrastructure nexus’ and facilitates the 
study of ‘how changes in one aspect of the nexus affect other aspects and social relations 
generally.’  
Our definition of property rights highlighted three key elements, namely, the right to derive 
value from the asset, to exclude others from using it, and to transfer the asset to others (Anderson 
and McChesney, 2003). But these rights may not always be complete and there may be limitations 
and we see these limitations on display in our case. Although the homeless are able to derive some 
value from the assets such as the mining of bins, and can exclude other members of their 
community from these assets (specifically the bins and their sleeping spaces), these rights are 
clearly precarious and are dependent upon state agents or the formal legal property owners not 
seizing the ‘property’ and overriding the community’s rules of the game. The transferring of assets 
was especially curtailed which demonstrates the insecurity of their rights with respondents 
recognizing that trading spaces was not enforceable outside of the community although we did see 
temporary trading as related to economic opportunities. 
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By examining homelessness we have sought to add to the rich tapestry of legal pluralism as 
regards property rights that are official or unofficial, formal or informal, enforced centrally or 
through community logics (Brown, 2015). We have demonstrated the intersectionality of claims 
and rights with respect to the same physical property from the varying perspectives of the 
claimants involved and how this differs depending on the type of property such as whether it is 
public or private. The obvious parallel to be drawn would be with informal settlements where 
squatters have occupied land that is publicly or privately owned (or some other form such as open 
access or common ownership) but there is an interesting twist on this in our case. Unlike the case 
of squatters, who often lay claim to the property rights attached to the land as a result of their 
occupation, the homeless exhibited no such claim against formal property holders - be it the state 
or private property owners. They recognized and respected the formal ownership mechanisms and 
saw no claim against those, but were adamant that they had economic property rights which they 
could enforce against other homeless. These rules of the game were commonly understood 
amongst the homeless and there was a clear hierarchy of how competing claims were managed, 
such as that related to length of tenure. 
Our research shows that homeless people rely on a community logic to develop rules of the 
game which results in the appearance of a market logic (Venkataraman et al., 2016). In the 
absence of formal institutions effectively operating in the space of homelessness, the homeless 
themselves have constituted social norms which provide some semblance of property rights which 
are respected within the group. Without formal organizations, they implicitly through their actions 
determine ‘membership, rules, monitoring, sanctions and hierarchy’ (Ahrne et al., 2015, p 11). The 
homeless in effect construct, what McKague et al. (2015, p. 1087) call a ‘social meaning’ of 
property and build a local relational context for implementing the constructed meaning of that 
property space and this is pivotal for market development in the face of formal market failure in 
that context. Amongst our homeless, issues of territoriality are defined by the prevailing set of 
routines, norms and customs which are then extended to new exigencies (Schlicht, 2008, p. 622). 
For example, once a particular individual occupies a certain territory, which may initially be the 
outcome of a fight, the ownership effect will result in an entitlement in the territory and a partial 
recognition of the territorial rights of that individual: ‘the rules generate incentives because they 
elicit entitlements and obligations and induce behaviors that will mutually be taken into account’ - 
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resulting in an organizational equilibrium as peace (Schlicht, 2008, p. 616). In this way we see 
through repetition and diffusion, informal coping strategies taking on an institutional reality of 
their own. Instead of only recognizing formally sanctioned institutions, we see ‘institutional 
layering and complexity as a product of multiple sources of human action’ (Tsai, 2006, pp. 118, 
121).  
We see several areas for future research. Our study suggests that there may be scope for re-
considering certain key aspects of property rights and examining more closely informal property 
rights’ institutions that emerge symbiotically with formal property rights, and crucially, emerge in 
a manner that is not responsive to formal rights’ institutions, and which takes into account the 
principle of property rights without a transactional future. 
Second, there is further scope to examine the interaction between market and community logic 
and how this results in the institutionalization of rules and in overcoming market failures 
(Venkataraman et al., 2016). This has implications for how the poor are able to participate in 
market activities. For example, Brown (2015, p. 246) examines how collective use rights extend to 
public land and are crucial to the livelihoods of the urban poor and she states that the legal 
traditions in sub-Saharan Africa can often accommodate the broad definitions of what these rights 
entail because of the ‘mosaic of overlapping rights.’  
Third, the dynamics of how these logics come to dominate and how they may change and be 
contested through space and time are important. Within some countries the formal might dominate 
over the informal or the market over the community logic but in others it might be the other way 
around, and in yet others in may change over time and spatially within the country itself. There are 
many example of companies that have the formal rights to land but this land has been ‘invaded’ by 
perceived ‘squatters’ without legal title but with an informal claim to that land and these rights are 
therefore contested. Formally the company may own the land but it may be unable to exercise its 
rights because the informal rights supersede its rights and different equilibria may emerge over 
time and space. These dynamics need further exploration. 
In general, we echo the call of Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 734) that we need to ‘theorize 
more rigorously about the emergence of informal institutions and particularly about the 
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mechanisms through which informal rules are created, communicated, and learned’ and to ‘better 
understand the sources of informal institutional stability and change’. 
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